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Some Facts
While the distribution of the population of South A frica  on 
a dem ographic basis is a regular feature of population censuses 
and in ter-census estim ates, inform ation about the distribution 
of the South A frican  incom e flow among the main population 
groups is m uch m ore difficult to obtain. A fu ll-bod ied  statisti­
cal study of the growth of the national or geographic incom e 
flow differentiated by race is therefore im possib le at present. 
Only a rough im pression  of the general situation m aybe gained 
from  the available studies, three of which are b r ie fly  mentioned 
below.
Some years ago Mr. S .F . Thirion attempted a calculation 
o f the ’ ’national" incom e of each race in 1946/47 and com pared his 
resu lts with the previous estim ates for 1936 by the Department of 
E conom ics of the Natal U niversity and for 1939/40 by S. H erbert 
Frankel and H. H erzfeld. T h irion 's resu lts are as fo llow s : ^
TABLE I.
Income per econ om ica lly  active person, 1936 and 1946/47
1936 1946/47
Total per econ.active Total per econ.a
(R l, 000) person (R l, 000) person
White s 488,000 668 1, 137, 674 1, 179. 0
A siatics 12,144 190 27,020 341.2
Coloureds 28,950 104 60,012 172. 0
Native s 122,078 40 305,868 101. 8
A ll races 651, 172 158 1, 530,574 321. 2
1. "D ie Indeling van die Volksinkom e van die Unie volgens 
R assegroepe v ir die jaar 1946/47 -  'n M etodiese Studie", 
unpublished M. Com thesis, P retoria  U niversity.
2These figures must be used cautiously and m erely  to 
indicate general orders of magnitude. The methods of 
calculating the incom e and estim ating the econom ica lly  
active population are neither statistically  nor analytically 
perfect. N evertheless, Table I states in concrete fashion 
what every  South A frican  econom ist knows, nam ely that 
racia l incom e differentials are very  large -  probably much 
larger than in tra -racia l differentials (if the sm all number 
of extrem e cases are d isregarded). It a lso  tends to indicate 
that all the groups advanced in roughly the same proportion 
between 1936 and 1946/47, except the Natives who managed 
to forge ahead rather m ore rapidly. B efore actually 
accepting such a conclusion  litera lly  one should, of course, 
deflate these m oney incom es by appropriate consum er price  
indices designed for each race separately, but such statis­
tica l data do not exist at present.
No sim ilar estim ates for subsequent periods have to 
m y knowledge been  undertaken in resp ect o f the ra cia lly  
differentiated national incom e, but some work in this regard 
is being undertaken at the P retoria  U niversity in collaboration  
with the Bureau of Census and Statistics. F rom  this source 
it would appear that the total cash sa laries and wages paid to 
Bantu em ployees in South A fr ica  (the geographic incom e) 
increased  from  the R265 m illion  figure for 1946=47 to m ore 
than R500 m illion  in 1959, which indicates that the postwar 
r ise  in wage per econ om ica lly  active Bantu did not repeat 
the high rate achieved during the prewar period . The 
possib ility  of great strides in agricultural production by 
Bantu for  their own account esp ecia lly  in the reserv es  is,
I think, unimportant.
The above trend in incom es is  large ly  borne out by 
figures drawn from  industrial censuses by Thirion and van 
den Bogaerde respectively  in recent studies. Th irion 's 
figures relate to only White and Bantu em ployees and are 
here quoted from  an article  by P ro fessor  W, F . J. Steenkamp. 2
(2) To be published in the S*A« J„E« under the title : ’ ’Bantu 
Wages in South A fr ica " .
TABLE II.
Average annual earnings o f Whites and Bantu employed 
in private manufacturing and construction industries. 
1935-36 to 1960-61
3
Year
Average annual 
earnings at 
current prices
Average annual 
earnings at 
1959-60 prices
Average annual 
earnings at 
1959-60 p rices . 
Increase over 
previous year
Whites Bantu Whites Bantu Whites Bantu
R R R R % %
1935-36 452 84 1, 074 200
1936-37 468 88 1, 101 207 2.5 3.5
1937-38 486 92 1,097 208 ( - )0 .4 0.5
1938-39 492 94 1, 101 210 0.4 1.0
1939-40 512 96 1, 130 212 2 .6 1.0
1940-41 538 102 1, 140 216 0 .9 1.9
1941-42 616 120 1, 222 238 7 .2 10.2
1942-43 674 140 1, 244 258 1.6 8.4
1-943-44 714 162 1,255 285 1.1 10.5
1944-45 768 184 1, 313 315 4 .6 10.5
1945-46 798 192 1, 337 322 1.8 2 .2
1946-47 850 200 1.393 328 4 .2 1.9
1947-48 918 210 1,437 329 3 .2 0.3
1948-49 982 220 1, 444 324 0.5 ( - ) 1 .5
1949-50 1, 034 222 1,486 319 2 .9 (-> 1 .5
1950-51 1, 106 234 1,499 317 0.9 ( -> 0 .6
1951-52 1,244 253 1,559 316 4 .0 (-> 0 .3
1952-53 1,348 266 1,588 313 1.9 (-> 0 .9
1953-54 1,422 278 1,634 320 2 .9 2 .2
1954-59 ‘11,526 288 1,709 323 4 .6 0.9
1954-5^* 1,540 292 1,725 327
1955-56 1,621 300 1,774 328 2 .8 0.3
1956-57 1, 692 308 1,817 331 2 .4 0.9
1957-58 1,761 316 1,817 326 (-> 1 .5
1958-59 1,819 330 1,836 333 1.0 2.1
1959-60 1,872 348 1,872 348 2 .0 4 .5
1960-61 1,938 371 1,907 365 1.9 4 .9
( a >
Certain changes in the coverage o f the Industrial 
Censuses were made in 1955-56. F or com para­
tive purposes, therefore, the 1954-55 averages 
are shown firs t  on the basis o f the coverage up to 
1954-55, and then on the basis o f  the coverage for  
the years 1955-56 onwards. The manufacture o f 
m otor vehicle ty res , m otor vehicle batteries and 
the assem bly o f  m otor vehicles are included for  
all yea rs .
N O T E S:
(1) Average annual earnings include ordinary, incentive 
and overtim e w ages, holiday and other occasional 
bonuses and payment in kind, as w ell as the 
em ployers ' contributions to holiday, pension/provident 
and m edical funds, but exclude the em ployers ' 
contributions to Unemployment Insurance and 
W orkm en's Compensation Funds. 2
(2) The figures for  the years 1935-36 to 1955-56,
1956-57 (Bantu only), 1957-58 (Bantu only),
1958-59 and *1959-60 are based on the Industrial 
Censuses o f the Bureau o f Census and Statistics. 
(Figures for 1956-57 to 1959-60 are prelim inary). 
B efore calculating the averages, employment 
figures were adjusted to exclude working proprietors . 
For the other years the average wages have been e s ­
timated by assuming the annual increases to  be 
equal to those shown by the monthly sample survey 
o f  tiie Bureau. (Actual averages based on the 
Censuses and the sample survey are not strictly  
com parable).
4A ccord ing  to Steenkamp, these figures "rev ea l a sharp r ise  of 
over 50 per cent in the real average incom e of the Bantu w orker 
during the war years, but practica lly  no in crease during 1945-46 
and 1957-58. Since 1958-59 and in particular since 1959-60, how ever, 
a rapid annual r ise  took p lace . The average real incom e of E u ro ­
pean em ployees rose  far l e s s . . . between 1939-40 and 1945-46, but 
between the latter year and 1957-58 increased by nearly 36 per ce n t .. 
"O ver the entire period 1935-36 and 1960-61, how ever, Bantu "rea l 
average in com es" increased by2. 4 per cent per annum com pared 
with 2 .3  per cent for Europeans.
Sim ilar conclusions w ere arrived  at byDr .F .v a n d e n  Bogaerde 
in a thorough study of the entire wagepattern in the m etallurgica l 
industry. He attempted, among other things, to trace the pattern and 
trend of wage differences between ethnic groups em ployed in the m etal 
industry o f South A fr ica . Throughout his w ork he distinguished 
between pure d ifferentials (which m easure the difference in wage 
caused by the sp ecific  dim ension in question, i. e . ra ce , and general 
differentials which sim ply m easures the difference in average labour 
in co m e  between units grouped according to a given cr ite r ion ,e .g .ra ce .
Pure ethnic differentials in the m etal industry w ere, however, 
d ifficult to obtain, because, with the exception o f som e sem i­
skilled occupations, the only occupations filled by both White and 
non-W hite employee's w ere those of watchmen and lo r ry  d r iv ers .
Since the numbers of White em ployees concerned w ere sm all, the 
pure ethnic differential obtained here could not be regarded as 
representative o f the industry as a whole.
V andenB ogaerde 's  investigation was consequently m ainly con ­
fined to the trend in general ethnic differentials, which are 
obviously influenced by d ifferences in technical skill as well as racia l 
attributes. His findings can be summed up as fo llow s. On the whole 
and over the entire period of about 30 years since 1925, general 
ethnic d ifferentials declined as regards the Europeans /  Bantu, 
E uropean /C oloured and E uropean /A siatic ratios declined. These 
declines were not uninterrupted and, in fact, include re latively  long 
periods of increasing differentials. While the overa ll decline 
could theoretica lly  be ascribed  to decreasing wage differentials 
according to sk ill, or to decreasing pure ethnic d ifferentials, the 
m ain reason  for the decline is probably to be found in the penetra­
tion o f non-W hites into m ore skilled occupations, i. e . im provem ents 
in the occupational distribution of the various non-White groups.
His m ain statistical series  relevant to our subject are shown in 
Table m .
5TABLE I I I
Ethnic Income D ifferen tia ls according to the Industrial Census, based on 
to 61953- 548 In° 0meB ° f  P roiucti°n W ooers in the Metal Industry 1924/25
WESTERN
CAPE
POST
ELIZABETH
1924-25
26
27
28
29
30
1932-33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
e/ b e/ c c/ b e/ b e/ c c/ b e/ b e/ c"
DURBAN 
E/A A/B
SOUTHERN
TRANSVAAL
236
273
I87 126 379 257 147 610 145 521 117 358
194 141 407 242 168 514 124 536 96 432323 185 175 349 242 144 561 131 478 117 365286 190 151 332 258 129 518 136 463 112 341300 194 155 335 245 137 496 103 468 106 453330 210 157 317 254 125 500 102 453 110 445
571 208 274 328 179 183 510 161 523 98 326
423 219 195 346 205 169 486' 141 454 107 322284 222 128 366 250 146 506 104 4 66 109 446286 221 129 314 247 127 545 137 522 104 382280 221 127 325 235 138 510 135 472 108 350
313 230 136 320 233 138 525 137 471 112 343287 238 120 303 204 148 534 132 464 115 352298 260 114 309 229 135 551 135 446 124 331318 259 123 318 199 160 495 111 409 121 369318 247 129 287 205 140 523 130 420 125 322305 231 132 380 2 66 143 542 139 450 120 323
257 215 120 ' 318 189 168 496 124 377 132 305288 223 129 327 222 148 440 122 383 115 314291 201 145 332 203 164 410 112 316 130 282
289 135 142 324 185 175 387 110 282 137 256328 204 147 351 228 154 427 129 292 146 226
319 138 141 362 215 169 450 125 299 150 239334 224 149 366 225 162 467 118 298 157 252
365 259 141 383 236 162 467 134 328 142 246
378 262 145 322 206 156 461 125 319 145 254
391 261 149 417 237 176 490 141 314 156 223
399 261 153 373 239 156 485 141 314 155 223
c7a c/ b e/ b E/C C/B
419650 
414 644 
428 640 
382 662 
480 632 
492 638
318 641 
344 673 
485 664 
398 663 
378 645 
383 635 
406 622 
409 624 
447 604 
401 565 
389 507 
401 458 
360 423 
366 427 
351 424 
331 448 
359 475 
396 509 
350 502 
368 517  
348 528 
223 528
311 209 
293 220 
339 189 
342 193 
437 145 
341 187
366 175 
379 177 
404 164 
412 161 
399 162 
415 153 
370 168 
361 173 
338 179 
334 169 
311 163 
308 149 
281 15 1  
302 158 
271 152 
279 154 
292 159 
299 160 
338 148 
365 142 
358 148
Source : Table 97 in "Die Loonstruktuur, 'n  Ekonomiese ontleding van loonvorming
en loon d ifferen siasie  in die Metaalbedryf sedert 1924- 25. "
P. van den Bogaerde, unpublished D.Com. th esis , University o f  Pretoria.
E -  European} B -  Bantuj C -  Coloured} and A -  A sia tio .
6TABLE 17
Gross Earning D ifferen tia l o f  General Labourers and Operators 1950-59*
WESTERN CAPE POET ELIZABETH DURBAN JOHANNESBURG
c/ b C/B C/B a/ b C/A c/ b
1950 121 126 110 139
51 98 110 107 106 101 107
52 121 98 186 132 141 137
53 119 115 123 143 66 127
54 124 123 136 - - 122
55 119 116 122 131 93 108
56 106 123 103 126 82 119
57 111 113 127 119 106 107
58 110 110 107 111 96 111
59 104 111 134 114 117 110
Souroe ii van den Bogaerde, table 9 8 (1 ).
TABLE V
Gross Earning D ifferen tia l o f  Lorry Drivers 1954-59
WESTERN CAPE DURBAN JOHANNESBURG
E/B e/ c C/B V b E/C e/ a a/ b c/ a c/ b E/B E/C c/ b
1954 — 123 — 228 _ 158 144 • - 185 178 104
55 154 151 102 157 143 147 107 103 103 198 183 108
56 - 111 - 196 117 143 136 123 167 188 157 120
57 199 110 181 211 104 163 129 156 202 174 160 109
58 162 114 142 173 92 141 123 153 187 175 158 111
59 155 133 116 201 109 145 138 133 184 178 148 120
Source I van den Bogaerde, table 98(3)*
With regard to  the data in  Table 17 i t  must be remarked that the 
c la s s if ic a t io n  "general labourers and operators" i s  not a very homogenous 
occupational group so that the d iffe r e n t ia ls  here shown are l i t t l e  more 
than general d if fe r e n t ia ls .  Table V on the other hand i s  an occupationally 
homogeneous grouping but here the number o f  cases lnoluded are small and 
unrepresentative o f  the industry. I t  does in d ica te , however, that a 
wage d if fe r e n t ia l ex ists  which cannot be explained by any other faotor 
than ra c ia l d iffe re n t ia tio n .
This impression i s  confirmed by some o f f i c i a l  figures fo r  minimum 
and average aotual wage rates and average earnings in  the Building Industry
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8W hile, as usual, the minimum wage rate for the occupations 
concerned do not differentiate according to race , the average wage 
rates earned by  Coloureds in sp ecific  occupations were low er than 
those earned by W hites. While the differential decreased between 
1946 and 1957, it  increased again between 1957 and 1959. A pure 
ethnic wage differential between Coloureds and Bantu a lso seem s 
to ex ist. F inally the fact that the industrial, occupational and 
skill distribution o f the various races d iffer considerably is illu s ­
trated by the following statistics.
TABLE V II
P ercen tage  D is tr ib u tio n  o f  the E co n o m ically  A c t iv e
Population According to Industry, 1951.
Industry Europeans Ban la ColouredB A siatics
£ 5*
Agriculture & Pishing 14.8 40.3 24.2 13 .7
Mining 5.8 14.4 0.9 0.6
Secondary Industry 26.0 12.0 27*4 25*9
Communications 11.5 2.3 3*5 2.6
Commerce 18.2 3.2 6.2 24.5
Service trades 20.8 23.8 27.6 17.8
Other trades 2.9 3.8 10.2 14.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sourcet Population Census, 1951«
TABLE T i l l
Percentage D istribution o f the Economically Aotive 
Population according to Occupation, 1951•
Occupation Europeans
Professional & technical t -7
Administrative 8.0
C lerica l 20.2
Selling 6*4
Farming & Fishing 14 .7
Mining 3 .3
Transport operation 
Industrial occupations' '
3 .1
22.5
Manual labour 4.7
Servioes and undefined 7.4
100.0
Bantu^ ^  C oloureds A s la t lo e
ZÏ0 2.&
0.2 0.4 10.7*
0.5 1.3 3.2
0.4 1.6 12.4
46.3 24 .Ó 13.7
17.2 0.8 0.4
1.2 2.9 4.1
1.3 19.0 19.4
22.0 18.9 10.7
10.3 29.I 22.6
100.0 100.0 100.0
( l )  Sk illed  and eem i-akilled workers in manufacturing and construction. 
i2 )  Of whom 83 per cent is  engaged in ths wholesale ox re ta il trade.
\ 3) Kales only.
Source 1 Population Census, 1951*
TABLE IX
Percentage D istribution aooording to s k i l l  o f  employees in 
industries subjeot to  wage determinations, 1937-1954*
Degree o f  S k ill Europeans Bantu ColouredB A s i a t i c s
Skilled 86.0 4.4 17 .8 36.8
Sem i-skilled 12.8 15.4 30.9 31.2
Unskilled 1.2 80.2 51.3 32.0
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source1 Wage Board reports. About 
these determinations.
300,000 workers were Involved in
9E conom ic A nalysis
Despite the rather poor statistical picture I have been able to 
draw o f the growth of the incom es and the occupational patterns of 
the races in South A fr ica , it seem s at least clear that :
(a) there are large d ifferentials in average incom e leve ls  
between the ra ces , d ifferentials which do not show a 
clear lon g-term  time pattern ;
(b) there are im portant d ifferences in the occupational 
distribution o f the various ra ce s ; these d ifferences 
m ay be becom ing less absolute as time e lapses ; and
(c) there seem s to be som e indication o f certain "p u re " 
ethnic wage differentials that cannot be explained in 
term s of occupation.
Assum ing that we are interested in pred iction  and p r e s c r ip ­
tion, the fundamental question is whether the above phenomena can 
be m eaningfully analysed in term s o f human factors which are 
predictable and capable of deliberate change. My ob ject is to see 
whether the scien ce  of E conom ics p ossesses  som e o f the analytical 
tools requ ired .
It m ay be n ecessa ry  to stress the im portance o f the need for 
objective analysis. The question is not in the firs t  p lace whether 
the given phenomena are desirable -  obviously neither (a) nor (c) 
could be so regarded in any absolute sense -  but whether they are 
econ om ica lly  understandable. Only after having answered the 
purely "s c ie n t ific "  question could we, as econom ists, rationally 
pursue the m atter in term s of politica l econom y, i . e .  what should 
be done about econ om ica lly  undesirable te n d en c ie s .' ' In South 
A frica  we are so tragica lly  impatient to settle the last question that 
we seldom  attempt to address our minds unreservedly  to answering 
the firs t . Yet it should be possib le  to do so without the perpetual 
fear that d ifferences in politica l philosophy m ight cause m isu n der­
standings and in the United States, for instance,interesting w ork in 
this connection has been done by a number o f sch o lars . (4)
(3) This is still far rem oved from  justifying, or for that m atter, 
questioning broader politica l changes. I am re ferr in g  throughout 
to econ om ic analysis and po licy  within a given politica l o rd er.
(4) Cf. E li Ginzberg, The Negro Potential, and Gary S. B ecker, The 
E conom ics o f D iscrim ination , b oth discussed  by  Elton Rayack in 
an article  ^ 'D iscrim ination  and the Occupational P rog ress  of 
N egroes" in The Review o f E con .& Statistics, May, 1961.
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To begin  with, it m ay be useful to deal with two factors often 
re ferred  to as predominant in the analysis o f our problem . The 
firs t  is  the socalled  infinitely e lastic  supply o f unskilled labour, and 
the second is 'the statutory "co lou r b a r " . As a very  general approxi­
mation one m ight add that the firs t  approach attempts to rem ove the 
problem  from  the sphere of race relations and to c la ss ify  it as a 
"n orm al" labour issue, possib ly  com plicated by features of econom ic 
"dualism " or "underdevelopm ent" in South A fr ica , while the second 
approach tends to hold the Governm ent's racia l policy  entirely or 
m ainly responsib le for the existing incom e pattern. Neither approach 
seem s entirely  satisfa ctory  to m e.
In his m ost illuminating article  already re ferred  to, P ro fe sso r  
Steenkamp, (follow ing Dr. Stephan Y iljoen  and others) concludes that 
the ba s ic  factor in the very  large sk illed /unskilled  wage differential 
is the elasticity  o f supply of unskilled labour, "as it is "  he adds,
"in  all countries with a large underdeveloped se c to r " .
This view requ ires som e qualification. I should pre fer  to 
relate this concept o f e lasticity  to the lon g-term  h istorica l supply 
function incorporated, e .g .  in the c la ss ica l iron  law of w ages. In 
the short run the (M arshallian) supply curve of the Bantu labourers 
pouring into the cities m ay be very  inelastic with regard to the 
existing wage rate. The main point I w ish to make in this regard  is, 
how ever, that the very  large supply o f "unsk illed" as com pared with 
"sk illed " labour is explained by the fact that the main, sources of the 
two types o f labour are in very  different phases of the dem ographic 
cycle  for reasons m ainly connected with the present different 
ch aracteristics  o f each ra ce . Had the entire South A frican  popula­
tion consisted o f European stock, the supply curve would have been 
m uch less  e lastic .
To fully understand the wage and incom e structure in South 
A frica , it is , therefore, n ecessa ry  to bring the dem ographic d iffe r ­
entiation o f the South A frican  population into the analysis as an indis- 
pensible analytical tool (not norm ally required in countries with 
ra cia lly  homogeneous population) and not as an afterthought. We 
have, in South A fr ica , at least three clearly  distinguished and 
different races  -  the European, the Bantu and the Indian. The "C olou red" 
population is at present a lso  regarded as ra cia lly  a class by them ­
se lv es . What basis these differentiations have, or do not have, in 
s tr ic t  b io log ica l and anthropological senses is not o f d irect im port­
ance for  econom ic analysis. The definition o f race which su ffices 
fo r  our purposes is that which conceives race  sim ply as a group of 
people who are in actual life  regarded by the community at large as
11
a distinctive b io log ica l group with a com m on ancestry . (5)
To take this point somewhat further: if, by som e curious 
dem ographic twist the age structure and natural in crease o f the 
Bantu should assum e European dim ensions overnight, 'is  it likely  
that the sk illed /unskilled  wage differential in South A fr ica  (which 
is 300 per cent at present) w ill approxim ate the 20 to 30 per cent 
in E urope? The differential seem s to be a r e su lt  o f m ore  than 
d ifferences in e lasticities  o f supply. Is it the "statutory co lour b a r "?
"It is often overlook ed", according to Steenkamp (^), "that the 
colour bar, though buttressed here and there by legal enactment, is 
m ainly a soc ia l and cultural phenom enon.11 The only statute which 
could be said to have had an effective influence is the Mines and 
W orks A ct (Act 12 of 19 H , as amended, esp ecia lly  in 1926). This 
act in e ffect introduces a colour bar into the Mining Industry. The 
h is to ry  o f the introduction o f the apt p roves , how ever, that the bar 
was not ideo log ica lly  conceived by the Government, but m ore  or 
less forced  upon it by general European opinion. The only other 
statutes d irectly  providing fo r  p rescrip tion  of the race o f em ployees 
are the Native Building W orkers A cts of 1951 and 1955 and section  
77 o f the Industrial Conciliation A ct (1956). The number o f p r e ­
scriptions so far have, how ever, been quantitatively insignificant 
and could not be regarded as having had m uch influence on the 
general picture of wage and other incom e d ifferentia ls . The potential 
consequences o f " job  reserva tion " -  as the pow ers under section  77 
are generally  known -  w ill, how ever, be d iscussed  below . The 
term s o f the Apprenticeship A ct (37 o f 1944) do not differentiate as 
between ra ce , but the general requirem ents fo r  the enrolm ent o f 
apprentices are such that the bar to m ost "sk illed " occupations : 
i. e . as defined in the act, is at present institutionally e ffective .
Once som e non-Europeans som ehow manage to qualify, how ever, 
the stream  could institutionally speaking, increase rapidly.
(5) This was the definition accepted by m ost socia l scientists at 
the Honolulu Conference on Race Relations in w orld p e r ­
spective in 1954. See report with same title published by 
Hawaii P re ss , Honolulu, 1955.
(6) L o c . cit.
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If we should include in our prelim inary analysis all state 
d ecrees that m ay in e ffect in terfere with the ability of any race to 
procure wealth and incom e in South A fr ica n  we should add at least 
the laws concerning land tenure and papulation m igration.
In both cases a statistical analysis o f the influence of state 
intervention on incom e differentials is , how ever, not feasib le .
The n ecessa ry  data for  m eaningful correlations are just not available. 
M oreover, the actual econom ic influence o f the interference seem s 
to have been slight up to date.
(7)
In the case o f land tenure restriction s only a section  of the 
Indian group has in the past had the financial strength and experience 
to draw the land factor deliberately  and on significant scale into their 
econom ic decisions and their p rocess  of incom e form ation. To them 
the original "pegging a c ts "  before  1950 and subsequently the Group 
A reas A ct o f 1950, m ust have been serious impediments in princip le 
but the extent of the exem ptions granted over the years suggests that 
so far this factor has not been a quantitatively important lim itation. 
The Group A reas A ct, which incidentally rem oved the absolute bar 
on new acquisition  of land by Indians im posed under the pegging acts, 
m ay in future becom e a lim itation of much practica l im portance, but 
this w ill depend on the application o f its provisions which d ifferen ­
tiates between ra ces  but do not in principle d iscrim inate in favour 
o f any particular race . Such econom ic threat to the Indian popula­
tion, as there m ay be, would lie in the application o f this law, not 
in its princip le .
The legal position  concerning m igration   ^  ^ has likewise 
probably had little econom ic significance in practice  up to the recent 
past and whatever the significance may have been it could hardly be 78
(7) The relevant Laws are : The Natives Land A ct N o . 27 of 1913; The 
Native Trust and Land A ct of 1936; The Group A reas A ct No. 77 of 
1957. The e ffect of these statutes is to allocate the ownership and 
certain  form s o f occupation o f land in South A fr ica  among four 
racia l groups.
(8) The m ain instruments o f control are the Natives (Urban A reas) Con­
solidation A ct No. 25 of 1945 and the Natives (Abolition of P asses 
and C o-ordination  o f Docum ents) A ct. No. 67 of 1952. Indian 
m igration  is restricted  under the Im m igration A ct No. 22 o f 1913.
13
said to have influenced incom e differentials greatly . V ery  recen tly  
the adm inistration of these laws m ay have prevented some m ovem ent 
o f labour from  low wage areas to higher wage areas, but this in ter­
vention has been m arginal in p ra ctice . In general, a shortage o f 
unskilled labour has nowhere in South A fr ica  been  a noteworthy 
lim itation  on production during the past decades -  nor would greater >■
labour m obility  have enabled the unskilled to secure a la rger part of 
this in com e.
While it is not denied that the p o litica l differentiation of the 
races could have very  important econom ic consequences, we suggest 
that the analysis of this factor, as w ell as of the supply e lastic ity  
factor, and all other dem ographic and cultural facts that have to be 
m arshalled in this connection, require a m ore general theoretica l 
approach, one which could em brace a ll institutional and politica l 
situations and place them in their functional perspective . The out­
lines of such an approach are sketched in the following paragraphs.
What we w ish to understand are the fo rces  determining the 
incom e differential between the races  and the fo rce s  determ ining the 
wage differential between skilled and unskilled work in South A fr ica .
In the analysis we recogn ise  (which does not m ean that we support or 
oppose) the existence of a dem ographic differentiation of the popula­
tion -  a factor which does not appear in the national econom ic 
system s o f those countries that used to serve as points o f departure 
in the developm ent of general equilibrium  theory.
Let us com m ence with the sim plest case , i . e .  two ra ces  and 
two or three types of labour working under static conditions of 
constant cost. We shall subsequently have to rem ove som e o f these 
assum ptions. The two races  could be re ferred  to as "E uropeans" 
and "Bantu" and the three types o f labour as "sk illed " , " s e m i­
sk illed" and"unskilled". Let us assume further that each race  is 
differently  endowed with facilities to perform  these three kinds of 
labour.
Perhaps a word about the latter assum ption is requ ired .
A ccord in g  to resea rch  in industrial psychology no race  has a m on o­
poly o f any particular kind o f labour sk ill, but at this stage of the 
cultural evolution o f the ra ces , the m odes, or even the m edians, of 
the frequency distribution o f the m em bers of each race within the 
sk ill interval o f each o f the three skill grades chosen w ill d iffer 
considerably . This is the em pirica l evidence we need, because we 
are in fact studying the ethnic differentials with regard to average 
earnings in each o f the skill grades.
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The production possib ilities  o f each race  in each occupation 
is m easured by a com m on m easure o f perform ance or unit of 
econ om ic e ffic ien cy . One m ay, o f course, define the cost of 
sk illed  w ork in term s of the amount o f unskilled w ork forgone -  
the H aberler opportunity cost concept -  but we still have to use 
som e unit o f m easurem ent -  such as yards, num bers, ounces, e tc . 
Since we have abstracted from  the com m odity types produced we 
m ust conceive o f a unit that represents som e index of all these 
various physical units -  and sim ply call it a unit of e fficien cy .
The less  "e ffic ien t"  a people is in a particular se rv ice , the sca rce r  
that serv ice  among the particular com m unity.
Patterns of production possib ility  ratios fo r  each race could 
be as suggested below . The patterns assum e that the "A fr ica n " 
average e ffic ien cies  are low er than those fo r  Europeans, and that 
the total number o f e ffic ien cy  units o f unskilled labour within the 
capabilities o f each race is la rger  than the total number of e ffic ien cy  
units o f skilled labour, but in different proportions for  each race . 
(Indeed even if the e fficien cy  unit m easuring the amount o f unskilled 
labour is the same as that m easuring skilled labour, it would not be 
surprising to find that, if a community has to choose to do either 
exclu sively  skilled or exclu sively  unskilled work, they would be 
m ore  efficien tly  occupied in the latter d irection . This would be so 
i f  the resu lts o f the higher e ffic ien cies  o f the skilled m em bers of 
the community w ere largely  offset in the total by the n ecessa rily  
insignificant results produced by their untrained kinsmen endea­
vouring to function like skilled p eop le .)
Patterns of Production  P oss ib ilit ie s : Units of A verage 
E fficien cy  Produced in 10 Labour hours.
The sk illed /unskilled  wage differential could now arise under 
three different sets of circum stances, nam ely the cases o f full 
isolation , full integration and econom ic contact.
If the two races w ere isolated from  each other econom ica lly , 
the wages paid in each society  would, under our constant cost 
assum ption, correspond to the ratio of e ffic ien cy  within that society , 
so that among Europeans the differential would be 130 , and among 
A fricans 600.
"E uropeans" "A fr ica n s"
"Skilled w ork" 
"U nskilled w ork"
10
13
1
6
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If the two races w ere sim ply integrated dem ographically  
the wage ratio between skilled and unskilled labour would be d e ter­
m ined by the weighted averages of 10 and 1, on the one hand, 
and 13 and 6, on the other hand -  e .g .  i f  the econ om ica lly  active 
m em bers o f the races are equal in number the wage differential 
would be a lm ost 70 per cent.
If the two races w ere not dem ographically  integrated, but 
m ere ly  econ om ica lly  brought into contact in order that an advanta­
geous exchange of serv ices  could take p lace , yet a different e con o ­
m ic  pattern seem s to resu lt.
Because m igration  from  one racia l group to another is im ­
possible, m em bers of each race  can only o ffer that serv ice  which the 
other race is prepared to accept a cross  the rac ia l b ord er -  and 
com plete occupational specia lisation  seem s to becom e unavoidable. 
In fact, our assum ption o f constant cost conditions im ply for  each 
community that everybody can perform  skilled functions equally 
w ell or equally badly -  which a lso leads to com plete racia l sp e c ia li­
sation. It could thus be said that in this exam ple o f only two 
com m odities the constant cost assum ption a lso  defines the econom ic 
consequence of the indiscrim inate attitude that race  is synonomous 
with a certain  degree o f sk ill.
In our exam ple, the Europeans have a com parative advantage 
in the perform ance o f skilled functions and the A fricans a com para­
tive advantage in the perform ance o f unskilled functions. Each w ill 
specia lise  com pletely.
The wage differential, which m ay now be defined as the (double 
factora l) term s o f trade between the two ra ces , would lie  between 
130 and 600 -  its p rec ise  position  depending ideally -  as JohnStuart 
M ill had it -  on "the intensity of re c ip ro ca l dem and", but in practice  
by  all institutional and politica l factors that m ay influence the 
conditions on which each group m ay o ffer its se rv ice s . Thus for 
each ra cia l group an "o ffe r  cu rve" could be drawn to determ ine the 
equilibrium  term s of exchange.
(9 )
(9) Weighted by the num erica l proportions o f the two ra ce s .
(10) "Dem ographxc integration" would m ean the disappearance o f  
race  recognition  from  all socia l behaviour.
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The m ain difference between this case and that of full dem o­
graphic integration is that while the skilled/-unskilled wage 
differential in the "con tact" case could equal the rate determined 
fo r  "in tegration", it need not do so, and indeed, a m ajor task is to 
d iscover the fo rces  that cause the differential to m ove up and down 
within the lim its o f the com parative e ffic ien c ie s .
One purely econom ic factor is the m atter of payments balance 
between the two ra ce s . If no cred it is granted -  and it seem s 
reasonable to assum e that a community providing exclusively  
unskilled labour w ill rece iv e  little m ore than short term  cred it -  the 
A frican  group m ust rece iv e  enough from  unskilled work to pay for 
the "sk illed  w ork " they re ce iv e . (Obviously the Bantu in South A frica  
do not buy "European sk ills " , but they buy the goods embodying 
European sk ills . E lsew here in A frica , the idea of buying European 
skills no longer sounds strange). Since both racia l groups use and 
trust m ainly one currency between them -  South A frican  R eserve 
Bank prom ises to pay -  they are virtually on what would internatio­
nally have been known as a (gold) currency standard. Under these 
circum stances a decline in the term s of trade for any given reason  
would, ceteris  paribus, im m ediately set fo rces  in m otion to restore  
the term s o f trade to their previous level.
B efore , how ever, attempting to apply the above hypothesis to 
South A frican  conditions, there are a number o f additional th eoreti­
ca l points to cov er, although to the student of international trade 
th eory  all this is very  fam iliar ground.
An interesting point is the consequences o f introducing a 
third type o f labour, nam ely"sem i-sk illed ", into our arithm etic 
m odel. If Europeans have a com parative e ffic ien cy  advantage (or 
disadvantage) over A fricans in an interm ediate position  between 
"unsk illed" and "sk illed " w ork, it is uncertain who w ill produce 
this serv ice  in the racia l "con tact" position  without m ore know­
ledge about re c ip ro ca l damand. As long as our assumption of 
constant cost is upheld, only one race  w ill have to p erform  all the 
sem i-sk illed  work there is to be done, and this seem s to be the 
point to re lax  that assum ption, which m eans abandoning the arith ­
m etic exam ple and using the H aberler transform ation  (or p rod u c­
tion possib ilities) curve. This curve describes the changing 
m arginal rate at which the community is able to substitute one 
serv ice  type for another. ( This would also, incidentally re lax  the 
assum ption that races are indiscrim inately  and rigidLy associated 
with given degrees of sk ill. )
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Let us assume that m ost o f the Bantu people are , for exam ple, 
relatively  efficient in perform ing farm  serv ice  but few have the 
general background or the sp ecific  training fo r  m achine operator 
serv ice . The m arginal rate of substitution o f farm  serv ice  for 
machine serv ice  w ill then rapidly in crease  as m ore o f the latter 
serv ice  is perform ed . The transform ation  (or production p o s s i­
b ilities) curve w ill look something like the graph below . If we 
suppose, for  purposes of analyses, the Bantu to be isolated from  
the rest of the community, the Bantu indifference curve ' ' with
resp ect to farm  serv ice  and machine operation would place such a 
low m arginal substitution value on m achine operation over m ost o f 
the length o f the indifference curve that the amount o f this serv ice  
to be perform ed would be close  to zero  -  as in the graph.
GRAPH
In contact with the other' races in South A frica , a new price  
line becom es effective, one which attaches m ore value to machine 
operation in relation  to or in term s o f farm  labour, and the point 
o f tangency between this (flatter) price  line and the A frica n  tran s­
form ation  curve m oves to the left o f point Q. H ow ever, due to the 
rather flat shape of the transform ation  curve over m ost o f the area 
to the left of Q, (high m arginal fa r m -s e r v ice -c o s t  o f machine 
operation for the A frican), there is only lim ited scope fo r  this 
occupational redistribution  of labour-
11. Assum ing that by  the application o f the com pensation princip le , 
the conception o f a group indifference curve to be feasib le .
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An interesting aspect o f our example is that econom ic contact 
■with the European led to less specia lisation  in production (though 
not n ecessa rily  in consumption) for the Bantu instead o f m ore  -  as 
the text book  exam ples of international trade usually suggest.
This is called "d iv ers ifica tion ", a w ord which is  gaining currency  
in  o ffic ia l c ir c le s  in South A fr ica  no less than in the international 
o fficia ldom . The d iversification  in our example is , however, 
purely a price  phenomenon. The factor o f which the Bantu had little 
supply, but even less  demand, becam e m ore valuable in the light of 
the demands o f the entire South A frica n  econom y. To d iv ersify  for 
other than price  reasons would not lead to a gain in econom ic w elfare 
fo r  the particular population. This could be easily  dem onstrated on 
the graph.
The exact slope o f the new p rice  line -  i f  it is at the same time
meant to be the full factora l term s o f trade no other econom ic
serv ices  enter into the in terracia l contact -  w ill depend upon the size
and shape o f the transform ation  curves o f both races and the sets of 
r  112 ) user indifference curves o f both r a c e s , ' ' i n  order to bring about a
balance o f rea l payments between the two ra c ia l groups.
At least one im portant problem  rem ains unattended: w ill the 
rea l p rice  line o f machine operation in relation  to farm  serv ice  
apply to all ra ces  in South A fr ica , or would each p r ice  line be 
qualified with resp ect to race  as w ell -  as seem s to be suggested by 
som e o f the statistics quoted e a r lie r .
If the South A frican  econom y is prepared to sustain some d if­
ference in the wages paid to Coloured and Bantu machine operators, 
and applies the same differential (in the same direction) to the wages 
o f these groups in the m arket for farm  serv ices , then the slope of the 
price  line for  the Bantu would be the same as that for  the Coloured.
In general, a pure ethnic differential operating equally throughout 
a ll occupations w ill have no influence on the occupational d istribution  
o f each race -  although it would of course have an influence o f the 
in te r -ra cia l term s of trade. Such a universal pure ethnic differential 
if econ om ica lly  arisen  would be a kind o f "exchange ra te", reflecting  
the quality o f Bantu work in relation  to Coloured, or Indian, e t c . , 
a ll this in the eyes o f em ployers generally . If the differential has ho 
econ om ic m otive, it would have to be regarded as a (negative) im port 
duty protecting the standard o f living of the group receiv ing  the 
higher wage lev e ls . The "duty" would be fixed by the ruling ideas of
(12) C .F .C o F .K in d le b e rg e r : International Trade, Chapter 5.
Richard D. Irwin Inc. Hom ewood, I : inois, 1955.
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•what the d ifferences between the races in b a s ic  living requirem ents 
are . This is obviously a large subject which could be pursued 
much further but we shall have to leave it at that fo r  the present, 
except for  adding that the "exchange rate" w ill change as general 
levels o f relative e ffic ien cies  change -  a m atter of cultural and 
technical evolution along the lines of developm ent theory -  , but 
the height o f the "im p ort duty" seem s to be a function o f non­
econ om ic fo r ce s .
It on the other hand, the South A frican  econom y pays som ewhat 
m ore  fo r  Coloured labourers than Bantu in the textile industry, but 
less  in the mining industry, the argument in the previous paragraph 
breaks down, and we have to conclude that "p u re" ethnic wage d if ­
ferentials are fully explained, not by a universal ethnic d ifferen tia ­
tion, but by  assum ed differences in sp ecific  aptitudes o f certain  
races fo r  certain  kinds of work -  a special case of product d if­
ferentiation, rather like the idea that no other country can produce 
quite the same quality o f w in es as F rance, and no other country 
can equal the re liab ility  o f Swiss w atches. This would rule out 
in ter-ra cia l com petition and introduce a system  o f absolute (rather 
than com parative) e ffic ien cy  d ifferences with the average incom e 
differentials between the races  depending altogether on re c ip ro ca l 
demand rather than relative e ffic ien c ie s .
W hatever the case m ay be, it seem s clear that the ra cia l 
distribution o f the total gain to the South A frican  econom y from  
in ter-ra cia l econ om ic contact could be analysed interestingly through 
the fo rces  determining the in ter -ra cia l term s o f trade. F or our 
purposes, the term s o f trade between a given ra ce , let us say the 
Indian com m unity, and the rest o f the South African peoples, can be 
said to m easure the amount of real e ffort and wealth the Indian 
group has to sa cr ifice  in order to gain a unit o f rea l incom e from  
"abroad ", i . e .  from  the South A frican  econom y generally .
As in "international" trade during the past 50 years, changes 
in the term s o f  trade o f the Indian community in South A fr ica  w ere 
large ly  due to changes in demand and alternative supply for over 
the entire period  their trade term s seem  to have deteriorated, 
which m eans that Indians generally  have to w ork harder to m ain ­
tain the same standard of living.
The Indian community outside the province o f Natal sp ec ia li­
sed in reta il trade to a very  large extent. Originally, i . e .  during 
the firs t  30 or 40 years o f the century, this has probably le d to an 
im provem ent in their racia l term s o f trade with other ra ces , 
e-specially com pared to other form s o f "ex p orts "  such as labour
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se rv ice s . During the past decade or m ore , how ever, im portant 
changes have taken place in the retail m arket on both the demand 
and the supply side . The r ise  in the incom e levels  generally  in 
South A fr ica , the growth o f cities and m odern  suburban shopping 
centres, the r ise  o f the Bazaar and chain store system s and 
finally the advent o f the superm arket, brought about a serious 
decline in the relative value of the serv ices  of the typical sm all 
Indian trading store . M oreover, the increase in the Indian popu­
lation happened to be m uch higher than that o f the com m unities 
they traditionally served . F inally  Bantu squatter camps and down­
town slum s, traditional trading fields of Indian shops , have been 
rem oved on a tremendous scale by m unicipalities, leaving 
hundreds o f shops com pletely  without any v is ib le  means of support.
This gradual deterioration  in their term s of trade with the 
"o th er" com m unities in South A fr ica  is making it im perative for 
the Indian community to branch out into other lines of "ex p ort", 
fo r  they have over specia lised  in a d irection  which did not prove 
to have dynamic p ossib ilities . This does not mean that the about 
500, 000 Indians in South A frica  should "d iv e rs ify "  their econ om i­
ca lly  active m em bers in all possib le  d irections. It sim ply means 
that the em phasis of specialisation  m ust shift.
A Short D iversion  on the Theory o f International Trade
The problem  of the term s of trade between the rich  and the 
poor, the developing and the stagnant national econom ies of the 
w orld , has reached the politica l leve l of severa l U. N. O. enquiries 
and d iscu ssions; the international or rather interregional m o v e ­
ment o f labour has thus far received  rather less  scien tific  and 
politica l attention -  but the very  big unfavourable population 
growth differentials between already "over populated" regions of 
the world and the remaining areas w ill, in future, m ost probably 
bring this factor to the foreground as never b e fore . Curiously 
enough the two problem s have usually been discussed separately 
as if they w ere unrelated, while, in fact, they are inextricably 
bound together: it is the restraint on factor m igration  that gave 
rise  to com m odity trade and the term s at which it is ca rried  on.
In fact the only hope o f the W est to avoid m ass im m igration 
esp ecia lly  from  Asi?. is to im prove the term s of trade of these 
countries in line with tlie growth of the population. In connection 
with this problem , Eugene Black, the financially and diplom atically 
famous P resident o f the International Bank expressed  h im self as 
follow s : "The plain fact is that the conditions for a full integration 
o f the po litica l and econom ic aim s of the r ich  and the poor nations
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in the free  w orld  community do not exist, nor is it possib le  to 
foresee  a time in the future when they w ill. F or  the rich  nations 
the problem  is to live constructively  with the h istor ic  tran s­
form ation going on in the underdeveloped w orld, not to try  to 
1 solve' it " . This task of "liv ing  constructively  with the p rob lem ", 
Black ca lls  the "D iplom acy o f E conom ic A id " and he regards this 
as a new vocation  for  the W est. That the E ast m ay demand m ore 
than such a show o f goodw ill and even e ffort on the part o f the 
W est seem s inevitable: the latter also has to pay in capital (for 
the right to retain the land on which they live to the exclusion  of 
the East) so that econom ic opportunities can be tran sferred  to 
unemployed labour instead o f the other way around.
To a ll this the c la ss ica l and n e o -c la ss ica l theory o f in ter­
national trade and developm ent still provides a m ost useful 
existing bag of analytical too ls . Some o f the ba s ic  ideas of 
R icardo on trade theory is destined for  a rev ival no less v igorous 
than that o f the Malthusian population theory, and one can a lm ost 
hear the ring of R ica rd o 's  warning to his co lleague: "P o lit ica l 
Econom y, you think, is an inquiry into the nature and causes of 
wealth: I think it should rather be called an inquiry into the laws 
which determ ine the division  o f the produce of industry among the 
c lasses who concur in its form ation . No law can be laid down 
respecting quantity, but a to lerab ly  c o r re c t  one can be laid down 
respecting p ro p o rtio n s ."  '  ' Both Ric.ardo and Malthus w ere
certainly less interested in the fact that groups o f people were 
separated by space than in the fact that they w ere differentiated 
by  nature or culture, so that it could be claim ed that the c la ss ica l 
theory of international trade fits m ore  rea lis tica lly  in a system  
of dem ographic rather than geographic labour im m obility*
P o licy  T heory
The scien tific  study o f a human hardship such as low  per 
capita incom es norm ally  has prescrip tion  in mind and the present 
study is no exception . The kind o f analysis introduced in this 
paper certainly has much to contribute to the im provem ent of the 
e ffic ien cy  of Government adm inistration in South A fr ica  but before  
calling upon the reader to.take part in an analysis of these p o s s i ­
b ilities for  better governm ent from  an econ om ic point of view, 
certain rem arks about econom ists and po litics  seem  n ecessa ry .
(13) Letters o f R icardo to Malthus p. 175.
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Since scien tific  p rogress  depends upon intellectual honesty, 
it seem s to m e futile to abstract from  the heterogeneity o f our 
population in structural analysis, or to oppose the existence of 
dem ographic differentiation^ ^  in South A fr ica  in econom ic p o licy  
theory. Only circu lar reasoning ..can resu lt from  confusing one 's 
point o f destination -with one 's  point of departure.
By the same token, deliberate attempts to show that d em o­
graphic differentiation in Government adm inistration or socia l 
behaviour is econom ica lly  rational, is equally offensive, esp ecia lly  
since such a bias cannot easily  be detected by experim ent or 
calculation.
In between these two extrem e roles o f the fundamental cr it ic  
and the fundamental apologist, there is room  fo r  a third econom ic 
function -  to take the present socia l system  as given, but to strive 
to render it econ om ica lly  m ore  efficien t. ( li>)
A fourth possib ility , to turn away from  the entire problem  
and devote one's time to something po litica lly  m ore  "neutral", 
m ay appear to be the m ost sensible thing to do. I have, how ever, 
com e to regard the issue as of great p ractica l im portance in the 
daily lives of all the races in South A fr ica . The vita lly  n ecessa ry  
in creases in the average incom es per person  among the non- 
White races  depend on the growth o f the econom y o f South A fr ica  
as a whole, a p rocess  which draws its dynamism from  private 
entrepreneurial action. This essential factor functions w ell in 
an atm osphere o f econom ic uncertainties and politica l certa in ties.
A ba s ic  requisite for econ om ic advance in South A fr ica  is thus to 
a rr iv e  at a form ula that can prop erly  explain and pred ict Government 
in terferen ce  with the econom ic system  for  purposes of politica l
(14) By "dem ographic d ifferentiation” we m ean that the population is 
described  or regarde din  term s of the separate features o fits  various 
ra cia l groups.
(15) This approach was, for exam ple, adopted by M r. Oppenheimer on 
behalf o f the A n glo-A m erican  Corporation in his m ost recent 
annual report: " . . The fact is that the wages paid in the gold 
mining industry have lagged behind those paid by other industries 
and the gold m ines have in consequence becom e dependent to a 
great extent upon labour im ported from  other poorer  countries.
"Attem pts to rem edy this situation are, o f cou rse , made m ore d if­
ficult by the legislative colour bars which are im posed upon industry 
in South A fr ica , but even within this fram ew ork we believe that a 
great deal can be done" (my ita lics) H .F . Oppenheim er. Annual State­
ment to m em bers o f A nglo-A m erican  Corp. "The Star", June 7, 1962.
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differentiation o f the ra ce s . F or  such a form ula to exist, it would, 
how ever, be n ecessa ry  for  the Government itse lf to understand the 
full econ om ic contents o f its politica l adm inistration and to act 
consistently on that understanding.
What is required is a thorough re-exam ination  o f each instru ­
m ent of politica l differentiation of the races to determ ine its 
econom ic consequences -  to com pare the econom ic consequences of 
the instruments regarded as a whole, to rem ove at least internal 
econom ic in consistencies, but possib ly  even to rem ove external 
econom ic "in con sisten cies" by  suggesting adm inistrative changes 
which would, without undermining the po litica l system , corre la te  
its econ om ic consequences better with the princip les o f the existing 
econom ic system .
This is a v ery  large task which certa in ly  could not be a c co m ­
plished in this paper - but one or two exam ples of what I have in 
m ind m ay be quoted. ' '
Let us, for exam ple, examine the possib ilities  of understand­
ing the instrum ent of " job  reservation " and providing it with an 
econom ic code o f d iscip line. The princip le behind job  reservation  
seem s to be the po licy  aim o f redistributing rea l incom e (and job  
opportunities) in such a way that full em ploym ent o f the population 
group in question is maintained, even if this m eans some sa cr ifice  
in the growth o f the average incom e per person  of the group. The 
South A frica n  Government, unlike a national Governm ent o f a 
hom ogeneous population, is how ever, appointed to act in the best 
interests o f each racia l group. Consequently it is in a position  
roughly com parable to the CONTRACTING PARTIES t1 ' )  to 
G. A . T» To only with many m ore clauses of agreem ent (m ostly 
im plicit) to adm inister.
It fo llow s from  the above that the protection  o f certa in  w orkers 
in  a given race  against com petition from  another race should involve 
the South A frica n  Government in the additional politica l re sp on s i­
b ility  to investigate the loss o f incom e to the excluded com m unities 
and to form ulate com pensations. It should at least involve the 
M inistry o f Labour in a con ference with the M inistry responsib le
(16)In the meantime a debate, on scien tific  level, o f the question of 
free in te r -ra cia l exchange of serv ices  v s . ra c ia l protection  
within the "con tact" soc ia l system , would be v ery  fruitful and 
should be encouraged.
(lTJlVbenspelled with capital letters this concept denotes the body of 
m em bers rather than the m em bers separately.
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fo r  the particular race until the latter rece iv es  the necessary- 
politica l m achinery to handle the situation.
This is a politica l problem  in the sense that it requ ires a 
political decision , but it is c lear that the decision  can be m ore 
properly  and c lea rly  form ulated against the term inolog ica l back ­
ground o f our analysis.
The m atter can, how ever, be pursued somewhat further in 
the technical term s o f econom ics and Government adm inistration.
In the f ir s t  place, a ban on "im p orts" o f se rv ices  from  a given 
racia l group m ay give rise  to an automatic term s o f trade and "balance 
o f paym ents" adjustment o f incom e levels which m ay im poverish  
all the groups concerned. Secondly, the general approach suggests 
the same adm inistrative objections against the present system  of 
job  reservation  as against the system  of im port control by  (quanti­
tative) quota. This is not the time to enlarge upon these adm ini­
strative issu es , but it should be pointed out that the well-known 
debate over im port control v s . tari ff protection  m ay be useful 
for  our purposes -  for it is quite conceivable that the present form  
o f quantitative prescrip tion  o f job  opportunities by race (which is, 
grantedly, resorted  to only in very  exceptional cases) could be 
replaced by a system  of "ta r iff"  protection  of those jobs that are 
regarded as either strateg ica lly  or socia lly  im portant to a given 
group, or as n ecessa ry  to develop the sk ills of the group in term s 
o f the "infant industry" argument. In practice  this would m ean a 
specia l levy  on such jobs  according to the race  of the incum bent.
To the extent that racia l differentiation is practised  voluntarily 
in the labour m arket, one already has indifference system s including 
m ore than wages per time unit of labour. Adding a levy  to this 
existing socia l preference  system  would avoid the serious adm ini­
strative stresses  associated  with the present system . In this 
context, it is  possib le  that job  protection  by race  m ay eventually 
be of m ore  constructive value to the Bantu people than to other 
racia l groups in South A fr ica .
This way o f looking at the econom ic relations between the 
ra ces , a lso  suggests an im portant incom e obstacle for som e races 
in the so -ca lled  principle o f the "ra te  fo r  the jo b " . If applied 
r igorou sly  throughout all occupations it could resu lt in serious 
unemployment esp ecia lly  among Indian and Coloured groups who 
tend to "com p ete" with Europeans for jobs that are identically 
defined but in fact d iffer in the standard o f perform ance required.
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If, on the other hand the wage levels are forc ib ly  brought down to 
the leve l paid, say to the Bantu, this would sim ply resu lt in a 
redistribution  of real incom e from  labour to  capital -  an equally 
irrational resu lt.
In general it would be inadvisable in wage p o licy  to hit out 
d irectly  at any sp ecific  ethnic wage d ifferentia l. If the differential 
is m ere ly  a m anifestation o f an overall d ifferential maintained 
throughout, the po licy  m easure should be applied nationally, -  
something like adjusting the exchange rate -  but if the differential 
is of the product differentiation kind, a blunt politica l equalisation 
would sim ply put the person  involved entirely  out of em ploym ent. 
Thus, even when the production possib ility  "a re a s "  o f the races 
(transform ation cu rves) m oves up with tim e to the point where 
the average incom es per person  in each race d iffer by race in ­
sub stantially, im portant d ifferences by race in the wages offered 
and demanded in sp ecific  jobs m ay continue to ex ist.
Spending and M ultiplier Analysis
In general econom ic theory the m ultip lier function cannot be 
said to have been very  useful in, or even intended for , structural 
analysis -  in contrast to its use in cy clica l fis ca l and m onetary 
po licy . Its use in the present context is a lso , no doubt, lim ited 
but it seem s that a high propensity to support one 's own group 
where possib le  in one's spending habits does m ean that the 
particular group rem ains in payments balance with the other 
groups at a re latively  high leve l of em ploym ent. This has no 
meaning in period of rapid growth at full em ploym ent rates, but 
it could m ean something for a group such as the Indian, who m ay 
be finding its incom e term s o f trade with other groups declining 
steadily.
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